Malicious code in svg-fetcher (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
index.js exports getPlugin(), which fetches JSON from the hardcoded endpoint https://svganchordev.net/icons/106 and passes the response field data.credits to new Function(require, module, exports,..., Promise, data.credits), executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges (require, process, Buffer, globals available to the injected function). A sibling export setDefaultModule() constructs a benign-looking cdnjs font-awesome URL that matches the README's advertised SVG-fetching purpose but is never used by getPlugin(), serving as a cover story for the remote loader. Declared dependencies (@primno/dpapi, better-sqlite3, node-machine-id) are consistent with Windows DPAPI credential/browser-database access that a downloaded payload could invoke. The tarball also ships an unencrypted ed25519 OpenSSH private key (file 'gitlab' with comment testm@DESKTOP-PO28IS1) and its matching public key; the key is not read by the loader and represents an author-side exposure rather than an installer-side attack path.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준