Malicious code in @salem_jalal/osc-components (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
The package's postinstall hook (install.js, wired via package.json scripts.postinstall) runs on every npm install and transmits installer host identifiers — hostname, OS platform/arch, username, current working directory, Node version, npm registry env, and DNS server list — to http://dm-tech.ly:8001/poc-osc/callback over plain HTTP as a URL-encoded query parameter. The main module (index.js) contains an IIFE that, when loaded in a browser context (e.g., bundled into a downstream web app), harvests document.cookie, all localStorage entries, the current URL, and userAgent, and ships them to http://dm-tech.ly:8001/poc-osc/exfil with credentials:'include'. Although published under the personal scope @salem_jalal, the payload self-identifies internally as @dx-ui/osc-components at the same version 1981.17.7, indicating a dependency-confusion / namespace-impersonation attack against the @dx-ui scope. Console and path strings labeled [PoC] / poc-osc are cover framing; the code runs unconditionally on real installers.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준