취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (4a305ba94c92b6ec62aaf627fc1213d9e37e1645f37fd033f61c7becaba71edd)

ryry-cli runs as a long-lived agent that connects to a hardcoded WebSocket at wss://api.dalipen.com/aigc/task/connect and executes Python scripts under subprocess.Popen based on task messages sent by that server. During its polling loop it calls aigc/task/getAutoDeployWidget and, for each entry the server returns, runs pip install <server-supplied URL> on arbitrary wheels or downloads a zip and installs its requirements.txt, giving the remote endpoint unattended code execution on the host. utils.check_restart() writes a shell script that runs apt-get update && apt-get upgrade && apt-get install -y... and pip install -U ryry-cli and schedules it via at now + 1 minutes or Windows schtasks, mutating system packages and self-upgrading the CLI outside the user's package manager. taskUtils posts JSON payloads containing socket.gethostname() and a MAC/CPU-serial-derived device id, plus task log files, to a hardcoded WeChat work webhook at qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/webhook/send with an embedded key. A server-supplied Mihomo/Clash subscription URL fetched from aigc/task/config is applied by proxy_manager to route the agent's outbound traffic through an author-controlled proxy configuration. The package also embeds base64-encoded Aliyun OSS access-key ID and secret (utils.K1/K2) that are decoded at runtime and used to PUT files to the author's p-template-hk / p-upload-gz buckets.