취약점

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (1ee06d7aabbdf76969119c2f986e18bbc7f0dcac59ae9cae4f7a04798f2d083d)

The package installs pantheon_agents-setup.pth into site-packages, which Python auto-executes at every interpreter startup (broader than import-time, fires on any python invocation regardless of whether the package is imported). The single-line.pth body wraps its payload in exec() of an obfuscated string using systematically renamed single-letter aliased imports (os as _O, tempfile as _T, urllib.request as _u, subprocess as _s, platform as _p, etc.), which hides urllib.request.urlretrieve, zipfile extraction, os.chmod, and subprocess.run from static AST inspection. The payload downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it 0o775, and runs it against a _index.js file resolved by glob across pantheon/*/_index.js. A sentinel file at /tmp/.bun_ran gates re-execution. Two compounding harms: (1) Python startup performs unconditional outbound network fetch and writes/executes a fetched binary outside Python's view — the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern; (2) any sibling package (or future update) that drops a file at pantheon/*/_index.js is silently executed by the dropped Bun binary at every Python startup, providing a persistent execution sink. The combination of .pth auto-execution, exec()-wrapped obfuscation, and remote-runtime fetch+execute is a textbook supply-chain-attack fingerprint.

Source: kam193 (57f0e964aed446fe82998f13d1cbc577bff274378d980b551e4c134d093ab016)

Versions 0.6.1, 0.6.2 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• compromised-package

• exfiltration-env-variables

• exfiltration-cloud-tokens

• exfiltration-credentials

• abuses-pth

• obfuscation

• infostealer

• The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.

• exfiltration-crypto

• files-exfiltration

• destructive-actions