Malicious code in mui-option (npm)
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
The sole shipped file index.js is heavily obfuscated with a base64+RC4 string-array decoder that hides all module names, URLs, and method identifiers. On import (main entrypoint), it requires child_process, os, fs, path, crypto and https, issues an https.get to a runtime-decoded URL, splits the response on ':' into an IV and ciphertext, derives a key with crypto.scryptSync, decrypts the payload with crypto.createDecipheriv, writes the decrypted bytes to a file under os.tmpdir(), and executes that file via child_process.exec. The package has no legitimate advertised functionality, its name resembles the MUI ecosystem, and no other code path exists. Any project that requires mui-option triggers execution of attacker-controlled native code on the installer host. The tarball also ships npm_recovery_codes.txt containing five 64-character hex strings matching the format of npm 2FA recovery codes, suggesting a publishing-account compromise.
왜 이 VPI인가 (설명가능 · 실험적)
VPI 산정 기준
| 영향도(기본값(정보 없음)) | 55.00 |
| 악용 신호(추가 악용신호 없음) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 공식 vpi-v1 기준