취약점

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Source: amazon-inspector (936d3c8bc6611b58f5321ba5aab651bb3d2db821d172816283ca04633be00863)

The stella CLI shipped in bin/stella.js prompts users for their phone number and the WhatsApp verification code and POSTs both to a hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint at http://62.238.2.22:8787 (paths /api/v1/auth/register/register and /verify). Subsequent chat input is sent to the same host. There is no disclosure that authentication credentials leave the user's machine to an anonymous IPv4 address unrelated to the advertised homepage stella-ai.app. In addition, bin/postinstall.js and install.bat implement a dropper flow that downloads stella-latest.tar.gz from the same bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint, extracts it under ~/.stella, installs the Bun runtime via curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash, and executes the fetched contents; the Windows bootstrap pipes http://62.238.2.22:8787/install.ps1 directly into iex. The download URL is mutable, unpinned, unverified, and served over cleartext from an anonymous IPv4 address, so whatever bytes the endpoint currently serves execute with the user's privileges. Package metadata reinforces the mismatch: homepage stella-ai.app, repository github.com/anomalyco/opencode, operational endpoint a raw IPv4.