A vulnerability in keras-team/keras version 3.15.0 allows unsafe deserialization of attacker-controlled PyTorch pickle data through the public `keras.layers.TorchModuleWrapper.from_config` method. This method invokes `torch.load(..., weights_only=False)` without requiring an explicit unsafe opt-in, such as a `safe_mode=False` parameter. When called outside a `SafeModeScope(True)` context, the absence of an ambient safe mode state permits unsafe deserialization by default. This issue can lead to
A vulnerability in keras-team/keras version 3.15.0 allows unsafe deserialization of attacker-controlled PyTorch pickle data through the public keras.layers.TorchModuleWrapper.from_config method. This method invokes torch.load(..., weights_only=False) without requiring an explicit unsafe opt-in, such as a safe_mode=False parameter. When called outside a SafeModeScope(True) context, the absence of an ambient safe mode state permits unsafe deserialization by default. This issue can lead to arbitrary code execution if untrusted Keras layer configurations are processed using this method. The vulnerability arises because the method does not enforce safe deserialization practices unless explicitly guarded by Keras safe mode.
为什么是这个 VPI(可解释·实验性)
VPI 计算依据
| 影响度 | 78.00 |
| 利用信号(无额外利用信号) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 78.00 |
VPI 公式 vpi-v1