In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound requests When a compound request such as READ + QUERY_INFO(Security) is received, and the first command (READ) consumes most of the response buffer, ksmbd could write beyond the allocated buffer while building a security descriptor. The root cause was that smb2_get_info_sec() checked buffer space using ppntsd_size from xattr, while build_sec_desc() often synthesized a significan
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound requests
When a compound request such as READ + QUERY_INFO(Security) is received, and the first command (READ) consumes most of the response buffer, ksmbd could write beyond the allocated buffer while building a security descriptor.
The root cause was that smb2_get_info_sec() checked buffer space using ppntsd_size from xattr, while build_sec_desc() often synthesized a significantly larger descriptor from POSIX ACLs.
This patch introduces smb_acl_sec_desc_scratch_len() to accurately compute the final descriptor size beforehand, performs proper buffer checking with smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len(), and uses exact-sized allocation + iov pinning.
为什么是这个 VPI(可解释·实验性)
VPI 计算依据
| 影响度 | 88.00 |
| 利用信号(无额外利用信号) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 88.00 |
VPI 公式 vpi-v1