In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() builds the allocation length for a global TT response in 16-bit temporaries. When a remote originator advertises a large enough global TT, the TT payload length plus the VLAN header offset can exceed 65535 and wrap before kmalloc(). The full-table response path still uses the original TT payload length when it fills tt_change, so the
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() builds the allocation length for a global TT response in 16-bit temporaries. When a remote originator advertises a large enough global TT, the TT payload length plus the VLAN header offset can exceed 65535 and wrap before kmalloc().
The full-table response path still uses the original TT payload length when it fills tt_change, so the wrapped allocation is too small and batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() writes past the end of the heap object before the later packet-size check runs.
Fix this by rejecting TT responses whose TVLV value length cannot fit in the 16-bit TVLV payload length field.
为什么是这个 VPI(可解释·实验性)
VPI 计算依据
| 影响度 | 98.00 |
| 利用信号(无额外利用信号) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 98.00 |
VPI 公式 vpi-v1