In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within rsp_iov[1]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length) rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on 32-bit builds.
为什么是这个 VPI(可解释·实验性)
VPI 计算依据
| 影响度 | 81.00 |
| 利用信号(无额外利用信号) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 81.00 |
VPI 公式 vpi-v1