apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can su
apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7.
为什么是这个 VPI(可解释·实验性)
VPI 计算依据
| 影响度 | 75.00 |
| 利用信号(无额外利用信号) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 75.00 |
VPI 公式 vpi-v1
| 来源 | CVSS 版本 | 基础评分 | 严重程度 | 向量字符串 | 评估日期 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NVDNIST | 3.1 | 7.5 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N | 2026. 05. 13. |
| OSV3rd | 3.1 | 7.5 | HIGH |
| CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
| 2026. 05. 05. |