In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted. Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix th
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection
The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted.
Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange.
Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.
为什么是这个 VPI(可解释·实验性)
VPI 计算依据
| 影响度(默认值（无数据）) | 55.00 |
| 利用信号(无额外利用信号) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 55.00 |
VPI 公式 vpi-v1