The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker
The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.
Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.
为什么是这个 VPI(可解释·实验性)
VPI 计算依据
| 影响度 | 88.00 |
| 利用信号(无额外利用信号) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 88.00 |
VPI 公式 vpi-v1
| 来源 | CVSS 版本 | 基础评分 | 严重程度 | 向量字符串 | 评估日期 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NVDNIST | 4.0 | 8.8 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X | 2026. 06. 02. |
| NVDNIST | 3.1 |
| 8.2 |
HIGH |
| CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 2026. 06. 02. |