In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: cmis: validate start_cmd_payload_size from module The CMIS firmware update code reads start_cmd_payload_size from the module's FW Management Features CDB reply and uses it directly as the byte count for memcpy. The destination buffer is 112 bytes (ETHTOOL_CMIS_CDB_LPL_MAX_PL_LENGTH - 8). So a malicious module (or corrupted response) can cause a OOB write later on in cmis_fw_update_start_download(). Let's error out. I
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: cmis: validate start_cmd_payload_size from module
The CMIS firmware update code reads start_cmd_payload_size from the module's FW Management Features CDB reply and uses it directly as the byte count for memcpy. The destination buffer is 112 bytes (ETHTOOL_CMIS_CDB_LPL_MAX_PL_LENGTH - 8). So a malicious module (or corrupted response) can cause a OOB write later on in cmis_fw_update_start_download().
Let's error out. If modules that expect longer LPL writes actually exist we should revisit.
struct cmis_cdb_start_fw_download_pl's definition has to move, no change there.
为什么是这个 VPI(可解释·实验性)
VPI 计算依据
| 影响度 | 78.00 |
| 利用信号(无额外利用信号) | ×1.00 |
| VPI | 78.00 |
VPI 公式 vpi-v1